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Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never Again)
ABSTRACT

This article has three goals: to describe the origins and
development of environmental standing law, to present theoretical
objections to the requirement that environmental plaintiffs demonstrate an
"injury in fact" as it is currently understood, and to use the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Summers v. Earth Island Institute to ground
those theoretical objections in an actual case and demonstrate the
inadequacies of modem environmental standing doctrine. The article
concludes that modem standing doctrine has no rational basis in
constitutional analysis or even reasoned jurisprudence, but rather stems
from a series of decisions exhibiting confused and obscure reasoning.
Further, from a normative perspective, there is no reason to believe that
the Constitution, either structurally via the doctrine of separation of
powers or directly via Article III, requires plaintiffs to demonstrate "injury
in fact." Finally, the Court's decision in Summers upholding the injury in
fact requirement demonstrates several important truths: the Court's efforts
to liberalize standing doctrine in several recent cases were insufficiently
aggressive to accomplish a permanent shift, and the injury in fact doctrine
has real negative implications for both the intellectual integrity of
environmental standing law and the environment itself.
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INTRODUCTION

Questions of standing - who has it, what it means, why it exists have vexed environmental law scholars, practitioners, and plaintiffs since
the inception of statutory environmental litigation almost fifty years ago.
The doctrine has become one of the most prominent features of modem
environmental law, forcing environmental plaintiffs to jump through what
are often impossibly high hoops just to get into court, regardless of the
validity of their claims on the merits. Standing jurisprudence in the
context of environmental cases has been the subject of extensive
controversy among legal scholars, with conservative thinkers typically
supporting a high bar for standing and more progressive thinkers favoring
greater access to courts. Standing law has shifted back and forth between
these two poles several times over the course of the Supreme Court's
dealings with it. In a major 2007 standing decision, Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court came down on what is generally thought to be the liberal
side of the debate, significantly broadening its application of the three-part
test for standing farther than it ever had before.' In its most recent
decision, Summers v. Earth Island Institute, the Court reverted to a more
conservative approach that relies on the stringent requirement of injury in
fact. 2
In this article, I will argue that this conservative approach is
unjustified from a constitutional perspective, and that the Court needs to
do more than it did in Massachusetts v. EPA to remedy the problems with
standing doctrine. While the Court's opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA did
represent a victory for advocates of liberal environmental standing law,
the Court's opinion did nothing to rectify any of the fundamental problems
that make conservative standing doctrine so anathema to the ideals of
environmental protection in the first place. This set the stage for the
environmental loss in Summers. In acquiescing to using the basic test for
standing set out by Justice Scalia in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlfe3 in
1992, even while significantly liberalizing it, the Court in Massachusetts

'See 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
504 U.S. 555 (1992).

2 See
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v. EPA gave that "Scalian standing"4 test further precedential weight. The
decision thereby gave strength to a doctrine of standing that is deeply
problematic for the goals of national environmental protection, as is
demonstrated by the outcome of Summers and its potential environmental
consequences. 5
Part I will trace the historical development of standing law,
arguing that its roots, while purportedly constitutional, are in fact largely
prudential in nature and have very tenuous ties to the Article III "case or
controversy" requirement. Those roots are based mainly in judicial
fabrication with minimal constitutional basis, and reflect outdated modes
of jurisprudence that are incompatible with a collective effort to save the
environment from exploitation and destruction. Part II will set out
constitutional arguments against Scalian standing. These arguments
demonstrate the theoretical and practical inadequacy of that doctrine,
which is fundamentally at odds with the best means available to address
the collective action problems that plague the pursuit of environmental
protection: citizen enforcement of environmental laws and regulations.
Part III will discuss the Summers case and its consequences in detail, and
argue that it demonstrates why the Court's liberal standing cases should
not be considered anything more than pyrrhic victories for proponents of
broader access to the courts for citizens and environmental groups. I will
argue that in order to achieve a doctrine of standing that is both
intellectually and practically viable, the Court will need to go back to the
drawing board, abandoning Scalian standing entirely as a failed
experiment with potentially devastating environmental results.

4 Jamie

Pleune, Is Scalian Standing the Latest Sighting of the Next Lochner-ess
Monster?: Using Global Warming to Explore the Myth of the CorporatePerson,38
ENVTL. L. 273, 281-82 (2008); see also JOHN ECHEVERRIA & JON T. ZEIDLER,
GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., BARELY STANDING: THE EROSION OF CITIZEN
"STANDING" TO SUE AND ENFORCE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 6 (1999), availableat
http://www.law.georgetown.edulgelpi/researcharchive/standing/BarelyStanding.pdf
(referring to Justice Scalia "single-handedly transform[ing] the law of citizen standing in
environmental cases").
5
See Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142; Massachusetts, 549 U.S. 497.
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PART I: THE ORIGINS AND HISTORY OF STANDING LAW
In 1992, Justice Antonin Scalia definitively articulated modem
standing doctrine when he denied standing to the plaintiffs in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,6 examined in more detail below. In so doing, he
explained that "[o]ver the years, our cases have established that the
irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements." 7
In order to achieve standing, a plaintiff must have (1) "suffered an 'injury
in fact."' This means "an invasion of a legally protected interest," which
itself has two fundamental components - the injury must be both
"concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical." 9 In addition, (2) "there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be
'fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . .
. th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the
court."' 10 Lastly, (3) "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely
'speculative,' that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable opinion.""'
In this part I will trace back these elements of standing (with an emphasis
on injury in fact) to their inceptions in case law, as well as explore their
constitutional underpinnings (or lack thereof) and prudential justifications.
I will then follow those ideas through the early environmental cases, and
then Defenders of Wildlife and subsequent developments, all with the hope
of demonstrating the confusion and inconsistency that has surrounded the
doctrine and exhibiting its lack of genuine constitutional origin.12

'See 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
7
Id at 560.
8
id.
9
Id (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
155 (1990)).
0
Id (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,
41-42 (1976)).
" Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38).
12 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact,and PrivateRights, 93 CORNELL L.
REv. 275, 299 (2008) (arguing that "historical practice .. . does not justify inserting the
injury-in-fact requirement into Article III").
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A. Injury In Fact
What makes Scalia's decision in Defenders of Wildhfe particularly
notable is the fact that the plaintiffs were suing under the citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act, which expressly authorized
citizens to sue to enforce that Act's provisions.1 3 By insisting that
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue despite this Congressionally created
cause of action, Scalia ostensibly declared the citizen suit provision
unconstitutional unless plaintiffs could prove an "injury in fact."l 4 As
indicated above, the origins of this doctrine are somewhat hazy, and have
no basis in the plain text of the Constitution. While the injury in fact test
is purportedly based in Article III of the Constitution, that Article states
only that "[t]he judicial power shall extend to all cases . . . [and]
5."1
The story of how this vague phrase became the root
controversies ..
is deeply confused.
in
fact"
requirement
of the "injury
Scholarship and jurisprudence on standing have identified two
strains of standing doctrine, which have come together in puzzling ways to
yield the injury in fact test. Today, "constitutional standing" is that
premised on the "constitutional minima" cited in Defenders of Wildlife,
which are purportedly required by Article 111.16 "Prudential standing," by
contrast, focuses on whether a plaintiff has a cause of action under a
relevant statute; today, that test is known as the "zone of interests test,"
because it inquires whether the plaintiff is within the zone of interests of
the statute. 17 Both tests have undergone significant evolution over the
course of the twentieth century. It is difficult to say which strain of
reasoning is responsible for the idea of injury in fact; while today it is
claimed under the constitutional heading, its first appearance in case law,

" Defenders of Wildlfe, 504 U.S. at 571-72 (construing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988)).
14 Id. at 576-78; see also William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, 11
DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 247, 253 (2001). An alternative way to view his outlook is
to suggest that Congress would not have intended to abrogate the constitutional injury
requirement, and that therefore citizen suit provisions are not intended to confer standing
on people who do not have an injury in fact.
15 U.S. CONST. art.
3, § 2.
6
1 See Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. at 590.
17 See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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as seen below, actually came in the context of an opinion discussing
prudential standing requirements.'
1. Constitutional Standing
Different scholars have placed the emergence of the constitutional
strand of standing law at different points in time, most no earlier than the
1920s.'9 As early as 1831, however, the Court was struggling with issues
of justiciability and separation of powers, stating that when resolution of a
case "would seem to depend for relief upon the exercise of political
power," it "appropriately devolv[es] upon the executive, and not the
judicial department of the government. This court can grant relief so far,
only, as the rights of persons or property are drawn in question, and have
been infringed." 2 0 It is clear from reasoning like this that the history of
requiring a plaintiff to be injured in some way is firmly rooted in
constitutional thinking, and this requirement is both sensible and justified
based on separation of powers principles. It is the further development of
the injury doctrine, and the restriction of what qualifies as a "right" to be
"infringed," that starts to become more problematic.
The 1923 case of Frothinghamv. Mellon exemplifies the move of
limiting standing based specifically on the jurisdictional grant of Article
III.21 In that case, the Supreme Court held that it could not assume
jurisdiction over a suit in which an individual taxpayer sought to sue the
government for what she argued was unconstitutional misuse of her tax
dollars. Citing concerns about separation of powers similar to those seen
in the earlier cases, the Court stated:

18 See

id.; Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); see also Cass Sunstein, What's
StandingAfter Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163,
169 (1992).
1 See id. at 180; see also Timothy C. Hodits, The FatalFlaw of Standing: A Proposalfor
an Article I Tribunalfor Environmental Claims, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1907, 1910 (2006)
(asserting that a majority of commentators find no jurisprudence relevant to modem
standing law before 1920 and collecting articles).
20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (Thompson, J.,
dissenting).
2

262 U.S. 447 (1923).
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[w]e have no power per se to review and annul acts of
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That
question may be considered only when the justification for
some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a
justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. 22
To assume jurisdiction without the presence of an individual stake, the
Court said, "would be, not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume
a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and coequal
department, an authority which plainly we do not possess." 23 Here one
can see the injury requirement, while still apparently based in separation
of powers concerns, implicitly tied into the jurisdictional grant of Article
III via the phrase "judicial controversy." The Court's move here is to say
that any assumption of jurisdiction that would infringe upon the other
branches of government is by definition not a judicial controversy within
the meaning of Article 111.24 While this move begs the question
somewhat, its logical shortfall is largely harmless given the legitimacy of
the underlying rationale.
To this point, there has been nothing unreasonable in the
development of an injury requirement - the Court has consistently sought
to limit its own authority to cases it deems justiciable without straying into
the realm of policy-making. While its logically questionable invocation of
Article III is somewhat superfluous, the constitutional foundation for its
decisions is still strong; this is because separation of powers principles,
embodied in the general structure of the Constitution, provide a strong
rationale for the Court's desire to avoid taking on fundamentally political
issues. In one element of its opinion in Frothingham,however, the Court
took a step that eviscerated plaintiffs' ability to get into court, and it did so
without providing any cogent constitutional justification. That step was to
say that Frothingham's injury, by virtue of being "shared with millions of
others," was insufficient "for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court
of equity." 25 In justifying this conclusion, the Court noted:
22

Id. at 488.

23

1d. at 489.
See id. at 488-89.
25
1d. at 487.
24
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The administration of any statute, likely to produce
additional taxation to be imposed upon a vast number of
taxpayers, the extent of whose several liability is indefinite
and constantly changing, is essentially a matter of public
and not of individual concern. If one taxpayer may
champion and litigate such a cause, then every other
taxpayer may do the same, not only in respect of the statute
here under review, but also in respect of every other
appropriation act and statute whose administration requires
the outlay of public money, and whose validity may be
questioned. The bare suggestion of such a result, with its
attendant inconveniences, goes far to sustain the conclusion
which we have reached, that a suit of this character cannot
be maintained. 26
The Court therefore held that plaintiffs' injuries, even if legitimate,
become non-justiciable simply by virtue of being shared with many others;
its only explicit normative basis for doing so, moreover, was the
46
"attendant inconveniences"
that would result from holding otherwise. 27

26

d
The Court appears to have made the erroneous assumption that any harm shared by a
large number of people is fundamentally political by nature and therefore should not be
justiciable. This assumption, and the resultant particularization requirement, pose an
obvious practical and ethical problem, elucidated by Justice Stewart in his opinion for the
Court in the SCRAP case (discussed later in this Part, see infra notes 77-82 and
accompanying text): "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because
many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412
U.S. 669 (1973). Justice Souter expressed a similar concern in a memo to Justice Scalia
regarding the draft majority opinion in Defenders of Wildlife: "Despite ambiguous dicta
in some of our cases, I doubt anyone would have standing to sue on the basis of a
concrete injury that everyone else has suffered; Congress might, for instance, grant
everyone standing to challenge government action that would rip open the ozone layer
and expose all Americans to unhealthy doses of radiation. Yet the repeated references to
a particularity requirement ... draw that conclusion into doubt." Memorandum from
Justice David Souter to Justice Antonin Scalia (May 28, 1992) (on file with author); see
also Robert V. Percival, Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law's Growing
27
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Note that the stated justification for what would ultimately become the
particularization requirement in Scalian standing is little other than
convenience, and not any explicit constitutional concern.
In Doremus v. Board of Education,2 8 decided in 1952, the Court
applied this idea again, as it denied another taxpayer standing to sue.
Quoting the companion case to Frothingham,the Court said:
Without disparaging the availability of the remedy by
taxpayer's action to restrain unconstitutional acts which
result in direct pecuniary injury, we reiterate what the Court
said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is
assailed: 'The party who invokes the power must be able to
show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely
that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with
people generally.' 29
This statement does not necessarily mirror the strict principle from
Frothingham that injury is insufficient if shared; indeed, the statement
here read literally does not necessarily preclude the possibility that a direct
injury shared among many people would be sufficient to get into court.
However, the Court again seems to use some questionable logic in its
holding, concluding without justification that the injury at issue in the case
is insufficiently direct simply by virtue of its being shared. This implies
that broadly shared injuries are a death knell for plaintiffs' hopes of
getting into court.
Further underscoring this point, the Court that same year, in Adler
v. Board of Education, denied standing to eight plaintiffs who sought to

Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT. REv. 111, 129 (2007) (describing standing as "the notion that
litigants should only have access to court when the harm they assert is neither too small
nor too large, but rather 'just right' - a kind of 'Goldilocks' theory of standing").
28
29

342 U.S. 429 (1952).
Id. at 434 (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
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enjoin a waste of taxpayer funds under a New York statute.3 0 It argued
the following in regard to the plaintiffs' argument that the statute gave
them standing to sue:
New York is free to determine how the views of its courts
on matters of constitutionality are to be invoked. But its
action cannot of course confer jurisdiction on this Court,
limited as that is by the settled construction of Article III of
the Constitution. We cannot entertain, as we again
recognize this very day, a constitutional claim at the
instance of one whose interest has no material significance
and is undifferentiated from the mass of his fellow

citizens.3 1
Again, the Court here commits the logical fallacy of assuming that an
undifferentiated claim is not materially significant. Moreover, the Court
offers Article III as the basis for the proposition that shared injuries are not
justiciable. However, the only citation the Court offers for the above
statement is to Doremus, which in turn (as seen above) relies for its
conclusions on the reasoning in Frothingham, which was based not on
Article III but on the avoidance of "inconvenience." 32 Therefore, the
Article III basis for the particularization requirement seems to have been
pulled largely out of thin air.
The Court continued to invoke Article III as a justification for the
injury requirement outside the context of particularization as well, though
the underlying justification seemed to shift over time away from the
separation of powers concerns that initially legitimated the doctrine.3 3 In
1962, the Court couched the question of injury in the following terms:
"[h]ave the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
"o342 U.S. 485 (1952), overruled in part by Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
3'Id. at 501 (citing Doremus, 342 U.S. 429).
32 See supra notes 26, 29 and accompanying text.
3 See Hessick, supra note 12, at 299-300.
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illumination of difficult constitutional questions?" 34 The idea seems to be
that only by asserting an injury can a plaintiff assure the proper function of
the adversary process. By 1968, this "concrete adverseness" justification
had worked its way into constitutional discourse: "in terms of Article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution." 35 In terms of providing an Article III justification for
the injury requirement, this line of reasoning begs the question just as the
separation of powers reasoning did - rather than reasoning from the text as
to what Article III requires, the Court made its own judgment about how
courts should properly function and read that judgment back into Article
III.
While constitutional standing continued to develop on its own
terms, that doctrine ran straight into prudential standing in 1970 with the
Court's decision in Association ofDataProcessingService Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp.3 6 Before investigating the progression of the constitutional
injury requirement after that point, it makes sense to briefly canvas the
development of the injury requirement in the prudential standing context.
2. Prudential Standing
While courts have been citing prudential concerns since the early
days of the republic 37 (indeed, much of the reasoning in the early cases
cited above might be more aptly characterized as prudential than
constitutional), the development of prudential standing as relevant to the
purposes of this Part can be traced to the Progressive Period and the New

34

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).

3 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
36 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
3 See, e.g., Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621 (1915); Tyler v. Judges of Court of
Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 407 (1900); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50, 54 (1868);
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 594 (1851) (Daniel, J.
dissenting); Henderson v. Tennessee, 51 U.S. 311, 323-24 (1850); Owings v. Norwood's
Lessee, 9 U.S. 344, 348 (1809).
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Deal.38 It is important to note explicitly that in many instances, the line
between prudential and constitutional reasoning is not always clear,
especially in the early twentieth century cases.3 9 The two analyses are
almost more readily distinguished by the context in which they arise than
by the reasoning they utilize. The prudential standing test is entirely
statutory today, which is no coincidence given its origins in the period
comprising the rise of the regulatory state.
Most scholars agree that modem prudential standing requirements
arose as a result of progressive Justices' efforts to protect progressive and
New Deal legislation from attack by industry. 40 The Justices primarily
responsible were Brandeis and Frankfurter. 4 1 Between them, they created
what is referred to as the "legal right" test for standing, wherein to
establish standing, litigants had to show that a legal right, conferred upon
them by statutory or common law, had been infringed. This served their
ultimate purpose of protecting regulatory action because competitors could
not satisfy this test, not having any legal rights at stake; only those directly
subject to agency action could have their legal rights injured. In 1930, in a
case about railroad rate regulation, a railroad company sought to challenge
the validity of an Interstate Commerce Commission finding of undue

See Maxwell L. Steams, Standing at the Crossroads:The Roberts Court in Historical
Perspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 890-91 (2008); Sunstein, supra note 18, at
179.
3 For example, Justice Brandeis at one point noted, "The Court has frequently called
attention to the 'great gravity and delicacy' of its function in passing upon the validity of
an act of Congress; and has restricted exercise of this function by rigid insistence that the
jurisdiction of federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies; and that they
have no power to give advisory opinions." Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S.
288, 345-46 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring) (footnote call numbers omitted). While he
made no explicit reference to Article i11, he did utilize the specific phrase "cases and
controversies," rendering the reasoning at least implicitly constitutional. See id. A
similar phenomenon occurred in Frothinghamwith the phrase "judicial controversy."
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
40
See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 179; Steven L. Winter, The MetaphorofStanding and
the Problem ofSelf-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371, 1458 (1988).
41 Winter, supra note 40, at 1374.
42
RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 270 (5th ed.
2006).
38
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prejudice.4 3 Justice Brandeis, denying standing, said the company did not
have the right to sue:
Such a suit can be brought by a shipper only where a right
of his own is alleged to have been violated by the order ...
. In the case at bar, the appellants have no independent
right which is violated by the order to cease and desist.44
Similarly, in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
the Court summarized the doctrine as follows:
The appellants invoke the doctrine that one threatened with
direct and special injury by the act of an agent of the
government which, but for statutory authority for its
performance, would be a violation of his legal rights, may
challenge the validity of the statute in a suit against the
agent. The principle is without application unless the right
invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of
contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege.4 5
The legal right test was not grounded explicitly on constitutional
principles, reflecting its motivating factors. Instead, as the Court's
language demonstrates, it was largely based in the relevant statutory
language, as well as the common law requirement that plaintiffs have
some legal cause of action.4 6 Both of these sources, as well as the explicit
language of the test, made it clear that Congress had the capacity to create
judicially cognizable injuries by legislation.4 7 On a very broad scale, this
Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. United States, 281 U.S. 249, 251 (1930).
Id. at 255.
45 306 U.S. 118, 137 (1939) (footnote call number omitted).
4Id.;
see also Sunstein, supra note 18, at 180-81; CASS ET AL., supra note 42 at 271.
47 See FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940) (confirming that
Congress could grant standing to competitors to challenge licensing awards); Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (noting that injury alone cannot create a
cognizable "source of legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation recognizing
it as such"); see also CASS ET AL., supra note 42, at 271.
43
4
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is what Congress did when it passed the Administrative Procedure Act 48
("APA") in 1946, which made its own provision for judicial review of
agency action.4 9
Section 702 of the APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal
wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof."50 In keeping with prior case law such as Sanders
Brothers, lower courts interpreted APA judicial review to allow both
objects and beneficiaries of agency action to get into court. 5 ' This was an
expansion of the legal right test to the extent that it understood people who
stood to benefit from regulation as having legal rights, as opposed to
merely non-legal interests, at stake. The Supreme Court's first treatment
of the legal right test in this era, however, took an unpredictable turn, and
introduced for the first time the concept of "injury in fact."
3. Collision Point
The term "injury in fact" first appeared in the companion cases of
Data Processing and Barlow v. Collins in 1970.52 The term made its
debut amidst reasoning drawing on both constitutional and prudential
principles, presented in such a manner that it is unclear from which
category it derives and to which category it applies. The following close
reading of DataProcessingaims not necessarily to advocate one particular
understanding of the opinion, but rather to demonstrate the extent to which
its reasoning is confused, especially with regard to the distinction between
constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
Data Processing considered the question of whether the data
processors' organization, as a competitor, had standing to challenge the
Comptroller of the Currency's ruling that allowed banks to perform data
processing services for their customers. 53 Beginning his discussion with
48

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-711 (2006).

50 1d. §

49

m.

702.

See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 183 n.97 (collecting cases).
See Data Processing,397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Barlow, 397 U.S. 159, 163 (1970).
s3 DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 151.
5i

52
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the mysterious assertion that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are
largely worthless as such," Justice Douglas proceeded to discuss both the
constitutional and prudential elements of standing doctrine. 54
He
introduced the constitutional issue by explaining:
the question of standing in the federal courts is to be
considered in the framework of Article III which restricts
judicial power to 'cases' and 'controversies.' As we
recently stated in Flast v. Cohen [citation omitted], '(I)n
terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction,
the question of standing is related only to whether the
dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution.'ss
Note that separation of powers concerns appear to have dropped out of the
picture entirely, replaced by the more abstract concern with sufficient
adversarial context. Using this concept as his "Article III starting point,"
Douglas proceeded to distinguish the Flast taxpayer suit context from the
competitor suit at issue.56 He did so by introducing the concept of injury
in fact, noting that "[t]he first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that
the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise." 5 Clearly a competitor whose business will be reduced has
suffered an injury in fact of the economic variety, whereas, Douglas
implicitly presumed, a taxpayer does not have a constitutionally
cognizable injury in fact at all. This second conclusion has little to
support it, given that the taxpayer clearly is experiencing some sort of
injury that has driven him to court in the first place. In truth, Douglas
offered no explanation at all for his conception of injury in fact. 58
To determine what is actually doing the work of distinguishing the
taxpayer here, one would have to determine what Douglas meant by
54

d
s Id. at 151-52 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968)).
6
1d. at 152.

57 id.

" See id.
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"injury in fact," and what categories thereof he meant to encompass in the
phrase "economic or otherwise." Unfortunately, he offered no such
explanation. Instead, his next step was to object to the court of appeals'
approach to the case, explaining that the lower court "viewed the matter
differently." 59 It is unclear whether "the matter" refers to the case in its
entirety, the injury in fact requirement, or the specific injury determination
in this case. The court of appeals had applied the legal right test and
denied standing on that ground. 60 Douglas brushed off this approach,
stating that "the 'legal interest' test goes to the merits."61 He then offered
his own approach to standing, without explaining whether he was
expounding on the injury in fact requirement or discussing a new
requirement altogether.
The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart
from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question whether
the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question. Thus the Administrative Procedure Act grants
standing to a person 'aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute.' 62
Douglas here introduced what has become the mainstay of modern
prudential standing - the zone of interests test. As noted above, however,
it is unclear if he intended to refine the method of determining whether an
injury in fact had occurred, or if he meant to create a new test distinct from
the injury in fact requirement. It is also unclear whether Douglas intended
to establish a prudential or a constitutional test. He stated only that the
59
id.
60

id
Id. at 153. This is a puzzling assertion; the legal interest test had been understood as a
determination of standing to this point. The assertion that it "goes to the merits" is, while
not an unreasonable view of the doctrine, not in keeping with how it had been applied to
date. See, e.g., The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (finding that plaintiffs'
potential monetary loss was a sufficient legal interest to allow them to bring suit and not
discussing that loss on the merits).
62 Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153-54 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1964 & Supp. IV)).
61
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zone of interests test is separate from the cases and controversies
requirement. This could mean that the zone of interests test is prudential
rather than constitutional; alternatively, it might mean that the zone of
interests test is somehow constitutional in nature without being directly
linked to the case and controversy requirement. There are several ways to
read the opinion that yield different answers to these questions.
Given the subsequent reference to APA judicial review, it is
possible that Douglas meant the zone of interests requirement strictly as an
interpretation thereof. However, it is equally possible that Douglas was
merely referencing the APA as support for his understanding of a
constitutional injury in fact requirement. This interpretation is supported
by the fact that Douglas introduced the zone of interests test as part of his
repudiation of the appellate court's method of defining injury, which he
initially discussed in the context of injury in fact. 63 The third possibility is
that he meant the zone of interests test to be the newest iteration of
prudential standing. However, this interpretation is complicated by the
fact that Douglas' next move in the opinion was to invoke prudential
standing as a separate category:
Apart from Article III jurisdictional questions, problems of
standing, as resolved by this Court for its own governance,
have involved a 'rule of self-restraint.' Congress can, of
course, resolve the question one way or another, save as the
requirements of Article III dictate otherwise. 64
Douglas' transition - "apart from Article III jurisdictional questions" suggests that everything discussed prior to this point had been an Article
III jurisdictional question. If that is the case, then the zone of interests test
as well as the injury in fact test (if they are in fact different) are both
Article III tests. Douglas offered constitutional justifications for neither.
The purpose of the above analysis is to show that drawing any sort
of doctrinal conclusion from Data Processing is at best a questionable
proposition. Given the lack of explanation, justification, and clarity in the
See id.
6 Id. at 154 (citation omitted) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953));
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)).
63
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opinion, its critical status in the development of standing law is
unfortunate and undesirable. However, DataProcessinghas been taken to
create two new and separate tests for standing - a constitutional inquiry
into "injury in fact" and a prudential inquiry into the zone of interests
contemplated by the statute at issue.65 This interpretation has become
mainstream despite the fact that a new constitutional injury requirement
emerged from the rejection of an old prudential requirement, not to
mention that this new injury requirement made what was once a purely
legal inquiry into a purely factual one, with no explanation or justification

whatsoever. 66
What did Douglas mean by "injury in fact, economic or
otherwise"? It is impossible to tell from the opinion, but the general idea
seems to have been to expand the concept of injury beyond the simple
violation of a statutory or common law right. Under the new test, any
harm to one's interests is sufficient injury for the purposes of getting into
court as long as those interests fall within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the relevant statute.67 What is unclear is how broadly the test
was meant to open the courthouse doors. Douglas did note that certain
non-traditional legal interests would qualify, stating that such interests
might "reflect 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as
economic values." 68 Other categories of interests remain ambiguous - Is a
purely emotional injury an injury in fact? What about a moral outrage?
Can purportedly illegal action comprise an injury in fact without concrete
damage to one's concrete interests? DataProcessingdoes not make these
issues clear, and the Court has interpreted the requirement variably in
subsequent opinions.
This is the predominant understanding of the zone of interests test, notwithstanding the
conclusion from the above close reading that the test was meant to be constitutional, not
prudential.
" See Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values andJudicialReview After Lujan: Two
Critiques of the Separation ofPowers Theory ofStanding, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 335, 34041(1991).
6 Data Processing,397 U.S. at 153. The "zone of interests" concept, somewhat
ironically, has been interpreted loosely by the same Justices who support narrow standing
requirements. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
68
DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 154 (quoting Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d 1965)).
65

20

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 17, No. 1

4. Moving Forward After DataProcessors
In 1972, the Court in Sierra Club v. Morton began the process of
fleshing out the holding in Data Processing.6 9 The case considered the
question of whether the Sierra Club had standing to sue as an organization
to prevent the development of the Mineral King Valley. 70 The Court
restated its holding from DataProcessing,explaining that, in that case:
[W]e held more broadly that persons had standing to obtain
judicial review of federal agency action under § 10 of the
APA where they had alleged that the challenged action had
caused them 'injury in fact,' and where the alleged injury
was to an interest 'arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated' by the statutes that the agencies
were claimed to have violated.n
The Court added, in a footnote, "[i]n deciding this case we do not reach
any questions concerning the meaning of the 'zone of interests' test or its
possible application to the facts here presented." 72 Interestingly, the Court
couched the injury in fact and zone of interest tests both solely in terms of
the APA, forsaking any discussion of a constitutional injury requirement.
The Court concluded that the alleged injury in fact was insufficient, not
because it was aesthetic/conservational/recreational in nature, but rather
because the Sierra Club had alleged an injury to the concerns of the
organization rather than a concrete injury to itself or its members. In so
doing, the Court stated:
[T]he fact that particular environmental interests are shared
by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.
But the 'injury in fact' test requires more than an injury to a

69

See 405 U.S. 727 (1972).

70

1d. at 730-31.
Id. at 733.
1Id. n.5.

71
7

21

Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never Again)
cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review
be himself among the injured."
Sierra Club is usually viewed as a victory for environmental
advocates, despite the denial of standing in the specific circumstances,
because it affirmed the idea that broadly shared environmental interests
were appropriate subjects for judicial review (and ultimately allowed
plaintiffs to amend their complaint).7 4 However, in the course of its
holding, the Court actually significantly narrowed the potential meaning of
the injury in fact test from where it had been left after Data Processing.
The Court noted that the Sierra Club's longstanding interest in the
preservation of the Sierra Nevada Mountains was not enough to render the
destruction of that wilderness an injury in fact to the organization:
The Sierra Club is a large and long-established
organization, with a historic commitment to the cause of
protecting our Nation's natural heritage from man's
depredations. But if a 'special interest' in this subject were
enough to entitle the Sierra Club to commence this
litigation, there would appear to be no objective basis upon
which to disallow a suit by any other bona fide 'special
interest' organization however small or short-lived. And if
any group with a bona fide 'special interest' could initiate
such litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual
citizen with the same bona fide special interest would not
also be entitled to do so.
1 Id. at 734-35.

74

See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu, The IdentifiabilityBias in EnvironmentalLaw, 35 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 433, 466 (2008) ("The decision was deemed to be something of a victory for the
environmental movement because of the recipe laid out in the opinion for meeting
standing requirements .

.

."); Emily Longfellow, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw

Environmental Services: A New Look at EnvironmentalStanding, 24 ENVIRONS ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y J. 3, Fall 2000, at 17 ("While the Court followed its standing doctrine in
requiring the plaintiff to be among those injured, the decision was a victory for
environmental plaintiffs because the Court recognized that an injury can involve harm to
aesthetic and environmental values, not only economic values.").
7
SierraClub, 405 U.S. at 739-40.
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It is difficult to understand why the threatened injury to a "special interest"
should not qualify as an injury in fact, whether for groups or for individual
citizens. That conservational interests were specifically included as
cognizable interests in Data Processingmakes this even more puzzling.
What the Court seems to be doing here is limiting injury in fact to
those injuries that affect concrete or tangible interests - the number of
dollars one possesses, the ability to physically hike in aesthetically pristine
area, or the possibility of viewing an endangered specimen. While this is
nowhere explicitly stated, the rationale for this move is presumably to read
"in fact" as doing no work unless it refers to some element of the concrete
world. The negative consequences and implications of this view will be
discussed in Part III. For the purposes of this section, it is sufficient to
note that it is equally, if not more, plausible to read "in fact" as meaning
simply "in truth." That is, the person must experience genuine negative
effects from the purported injury, but not necessarily in concrete terms.
Under this reading, the Sierra Club or any other individual with an interest
in conservation would be injured in fact by the threatened destruction of
the Mineral King Valley. The Court implicitly rejected this reading, but
once again, in what has become a familiar pattern, declined to explain
why.76 Despite this narrowing of the scope of the injury in fact test,
however, the Court's continued emphasis on the connection between the
APA and the injury in fact test was potentially good news for
environmental plaintiffs, insofar as it had the potential to limit the
application of that test to cases brought under the APA.
The next major environmental standing decision from the Supreme
Court came in 1973, in the case of United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures ("SCRAP").n SCRAP sued under the
APA to challenge an Interstate Commerce Commission rate ruling that
would increase shipping costs, and thereby render the shipping of recycled
materials prohibitively costly, which would in turn injure the
See id. at 740. The only underlying justification we see in the entire opinion is a
reference back to the necessity for adversity and "personal stake" with citations to Baker
v. Carr,369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) and Flastv. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1942), neither of
which does the work ofjustifying the Court's narrow reading of injury in fact. See id. at
731.
n See 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
76
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environment.7 8 Despite the attenuated and broad nature of these claimed
injuries, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing.7 9 It brushed off
the contention that the injury complained of could be shared by any
number of people, saying that "[t]o deny standing to persons who are in
fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that
the most injurious and widespread Government actions could be
questioned by nobody. We cannot accept that conclusion."so Further
explaining that "pleadings must be something more than an ingenious
academic exercise in the conceivable," the Court nevertheless held that
"we deal here simply with the pleadings in which the appellees alleged a
specific and perceptible harm that distinguished them from other citizens
who had not used the natural resources that were claimed to be
affected." 8 ' As in Sierra Club, the key factor was therefore the
plaintiff/appellees' factual use of the specific natural resources that would
purportedly suffer due to higher rail rates.
The injury in fact test in this opinion, however, was also explicitly
tied to the APA: .'Injury in fact' reflects the statutory requirement that a
person be 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved,' and it serves to distinguish a
person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation - even though
small - from a person with a mere interest in the problem."82
Interestingly, any constitutional basis for the injury in fact test seems to
have fallen by the wayside - neither Article III specifically nor the
constitution in general is mentioned once in the entire standing section of
the opinion. The Court thereby left unclear to what extent the injury in
fact test applied to suits brought under statutes other than the APA, of
which there was to be a great proliferation over the next several years
thanks to new environmental legislation including citizen suit provisions.
This shift in the statutory landscape perhaps explains why the Court did
not address the question of environmental standing again for nearly twenty
years.

Id at 675-76.
at 700.
Id at 688.
81 Id at 688-89.
82Id at 690 n.14.
78

79
1d
80
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In 1990, the Court decided Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation.
This was another suit brought under the APA, by
conservation groups seeking to enjoin the Bureau of Land Management
from engaging in its "land withdrawal review program," which would
have opened up certain public lands for mining and other private uses. 84
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the program in general was
too broad to constitute "agency action" within the meaning of § 702, and
therefore was unreviewable.85 The Court also upheld the district court's
finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficiently specific "injury in
fact" because they claimed only that they used lands "in the vicinity" of
the lands at issue in the case.
This is a significant narrowing from the
injury in fact test in SCRAP, where the injury was not only significantly
more attenuated but also much more general. The Court in National
Wildlife Federation expected the plaintiffs to identify and experience the
exact acreage at risk in order for damage to that land to constitute an
injury in fact.8 Scalia noted that "[t]he SCRAP opinion, whose expansive
expression of what would suffice for § 702 review under its particular
facts has never since been emulated by this Court, is of no relevance here,
since it involved not a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment but a Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss on the pleadings."88 Scalia here made explicit his
crusade to narrow the injury in fact test and foreshadowed what was to
come.
In 1992, the Court decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,89 in
which Scalia laid out his three part test for standing. 90 Before analyzing
his approach to injury in fact in this case, however, I will briefly
investigate the origins of the causation and redressability prongs in order
to discuss Scalia's approach as a whole.

8'497
8

U.S. 871 (1990).
Id. at 879.

" Id. at 899.

Id at 887.
"
88 Id. at 887-88.
16

Id. at 889.

8'

504 U.S. 555 (1992).

9 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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B. Causationand Redressability
Causation and redressability are really more elements of injury in
fact than separate requirements of Scalia's standing test. These elements
were formalized in two cases from the early seventies: Linda R.S. v.
Richard D. and Warth v. Seldin.9 ' Linda R.S. concerned the mother of an
illegitimate child who sought to enjoin a prosecutor from utilizing
discretion to avoid prosecuting recalcitrant fathers of illegitimate
children. 92 The Court held that she did not have standing to sue, finding
that she had "failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury and the
government action which she attacks to justify judicial intervention." 93
The Court further explained, referencing the companion case to
Frothingham,that "the bare existence of an abstract injury meets only the
first half of the standing requirement. 'The party who invokes (judicial)
power must be able to show . . . that he has sustained or is immediately in

danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of (a statute's)
enforcement."' 94 While the idea of injury being traceable to a party or
action is in some sense implicit in the concept of a case or controversy,
this was the first case to make that requirement explicit and central to its
denial of standing.9 5
The Court in Linda R.S. also made a point about redressability,
demonstrating that at least to some extent it is the flip side of causation.96
Redressability, as a concept, inquires, "if the court rules in your favor, will
the injury be redressed"? Of course, the definition of "redress" will be an

" See Warth, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see also Francisco
Benzoni, EnvironmentalStanding: Who Determines the Value of OtherLife?, 18 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 347, 356 (2008).
92 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 614.
9
Id at 617-18.
94 Id at 618 (alteration in original) (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488
(1923)).
9 See id. at 617. It is fascinating that this holding came from the same term as SCRAP,
where the injury seems so attenuated as to defy the concept of direct nexus. See United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669,
688
(1979).
96
See Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 619.
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important sticking point in terms of what the doctrine requires. 7 In this
case, the Court seemed to interpret the concept narrowly, holding that:
[I]f appellant were granted the requested relief, it would
result only in the jailing of the child's father. The prospect
that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in
payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative.
Certainly the 'direct' relationship between the alleged
injury and the claim sought to be adjudicated, which
previous decisions of this Court suggest is a prerequisite of
standing, is absent in this case.98
Redressability was found lacking here because there was no way to know
whether a court ruling would actually attenuate the injury at stake
(because of inherent uncertainties in the prosecution process, etc.). 99 This
ruling can be squared with SCRAP, insofar as in SCRAP, at least, the
fundamental cause of the injury (the rate increase) would be removed by
the Court's ruling in SCRAP's favor. In Linda R.S., by contrast, a court
ruling would affect the fundamental cause of the injury (the recalcitrant
father) only indirectly. Whether this distinction is a reasonable one is less
clear - presumably a court ruling would at least help resolve the plaintiff s
injury in Linda R.S., and it is unclear where the Court meant to draw the
line in its redressability analysis.' 00
Warth concerned a group of plaintiffs who sought to challenge a
town's zoning ordinance on the grounds that it prevented people of low
and moderate income from living in the town. 101 Ruling that the plaintiffs
did not have standing, the Court cited Linda R.S. in explaining the
concepts of causation and redressability as follows:

9 Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568-71 (1992) (plurality
opinion) with Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525-27 (2007).
98
Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
99

d

This problem would later result in the major disagreement between the majority and
Chief Justice Robert's dissent in Massachusetts v. EPA. See infra notes 165-183 and
accompanying text.
101 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 496 (1975).
100
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But there remains the question whether petitioners'
inability to locate suitable housing in Penfield reasonably
can be said to have resulted, in any concretely
demonstrable way, from respondents' alleged constitutional
and statutory infractions. Petitioners must allege facts from
which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the
respondents' restrictive zoning practices, there is a
substantial probability that they would have been able to
purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the court affords
the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners will

be removed.102
This seems to suggest a "substantial probability" test for the causation and
redressability questions, meaning that the plaintiffs injury would be
substantially likely not to exist absent the challenged behavior, and that a
court ruling in the plaintiff's favor would be substantially likely to remedy
the injury. Of course, substantial likelihood is a flexible concept, so this
test does little to determine what injuries will qualify as sufficiently
caused and redressable. At other points in the opinion, the language is
more exacting, stating that "to establish that, in fact, the asserted injury
was the consequence of the defendants' actions, or that prospective relief
will remove the harm" is a "minimum requirement of Article III.",103 The
Court's holding was actually fairly narrow, however: "We hold only that a
plaintiff who seeks to challenge exclusionary zoning practices must allege
specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the challenged practices harm
him, and that he personally would benefit in a tangible way from the
court's intervention."' 04 The Court's choice of words reveals the extent to
which the causation and redressability requirements are somewhat empty
of substance, given that they leave open the possibility that a partial
redress ("benefit in a tangible way," rather than "would have his injury
entirely abated") will suffice - thereby creating a line-drawing problem
just like that in Linda R.S. 0 5
102Id. at 504.
103 Id. at 505.

'4d. at 508.
105 See id.
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C. ScalianStanding
This was the status of standing when Justice Scalia wrote Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildhfe - vague and unspecific, certain that justiciability
required some sort of injury and associated personal stake, but unclear as
to exactly what qualified as injury and under what circumstances. Scalia's
opinion treated this uncertainty as if it did not exist, carefully crafting a
standing test that, while appearing to be generously supported by
precedent, does not do justice to the subtleties of the jurisprudence
involved. 106
Defenders of Wildlife involved a suit by the conservation group
Defenders of Wildlife against the Secretary of the Interior, seeking to
challenge his interpretation of a provision of the Endangered Species
Act.10 7 That provision, § 7(a)(2), requires every federal agency to ensure
via consultation with the Secretary of the Interior that its activity does not
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.'o While
the Interior Department originally interpreted § 7 to be international in
scope, it shifted its position in a regulation promulgated in 1986 to
interpret the provision "to require consultation only for actions taken in
the United States or on the high seas." 109 This decision allowed for the
unregulated progress of certain development projects overseas that
threatened the habitats of several endangered species.
Plaintiffs sought to establish standing based on the affidavits of
two members who had traveled to Egypt and Sri Lanka to see the Nile
Both
crocodile and the Asian elephant and leopard, respectively."'
claimed that they had a strong interest in seeing the endangered animals
again, and that the habitat destruction attending the development projects

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 557-78 (1992). Scalia had earlier
elucidated much of his thinking on standing in a Suffolk Law Review article, much of the
reasoning from which appeared in Defenders of Wildlife. See infra notes 196-206 and
accompanying text.
107 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 559 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988)).
108 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
109 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 559 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.01 (1991)).
"0 Id. at 562.
"'Id. at 563.
106
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would inhibit their ability to do so.11 2 The Court found the affidavits
inadequate to establish standing because the members did not have
specific travel plans for returning to Egypt and Sri Lanka, and therefore
their injury was deemed insufficiently "actual or imminent" to provide for
standing." 3
In delivering the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia provided a good
deal of argument and justification in support of his understanding of the
injury in fact doctrine and the history of standing in general. 114
Acknowledging that the Constitution does not define the terms "judicial
Power," "Cases," or "Controversies,"" 5 Scalia nonetheless argued, by
way of the Federalist Papers, that the judicial power is constitutionally
bounded by "landmarks still less uncertain" than those that confine the
powers of the legislative and executive branches." 6 He then spelled out
the three-part test for standing cited earlier, requiring injury in fact (which
in turn must be concrete and particularized, and actual and imminent (not
conjectural or hypothetical)), causation, and redressability." 7 He cited
several cases for each of these propositions, most prominently Warth v.
Seldin and several other cases from the 1980s that followed its general
lead in requiring more and more specific factual injuries or threats
thereof." 8 Among these was City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, in which the
Court had held that a man who had been held in an illegal chokehold by a
police officer in the past did not have standing to sue to enjoin the use of
the chokehold. This was because, despite having been concretely injured
by the hold already, he could not "establish a real and immediate threat
that he would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other
offense, by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part."ll 9

112

1d

"' Id. at 564.
114 See id. at 555-78.

See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The
Federalist No. 48 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellen eds., 1990)).
" See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
18 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
H9 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983) (emphasis added).
115
116
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In applying his test to the plaintiffs, Scalia made several moves
that served to make the standing inquiry even more challenging for
plaintiffs than it had already become. One was to make explicit what had
been hinted at in prior cases, 12 namely that "when the plaintiff is not
himself the object of the government action or inaction he challenges,
standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more difficult'
to establish."' 2 1 This more or less creates a presumption against standing
for regulatory and statutory beneficiaries by assuming that they will be
unlikely to be able to show the appropriate degree of traceable injury.
Scalia also made a much more significant and problematic argument in
Defenders of Wildlife, which was to reject the concept of procedural injury
as a valid source of standing.
Scalia rejected the approach of the court of appeals in Defenders of
Wildife, which had been to grant plaintiffs standing based on the idea that
the government's failure to follow the procedural requirements of the
Endangered Species Act itself constituted an injury in fact. 2 2 As Scalia
put it, "the court held that the injury-in-fact requirement had been satisfied
by congressional conferral upon all persons of an abstract, self-contained,
noninstrumental 'right' to have the Executive observe the procedures
required by law. We reject this view."1 23 Scalia hastened to explain that
he did not intend to say that no citizen could enforce her procedural rights
under a given statute; instead, the ability to enforce those rights required
that a plaintiff have a concrete interest at stake that the rights were
supposedly protecting.1
He offered as examples that dedicated whale
watchers could exercise their procedural rights in court when their ability
to see whales was threatened by whale harvesting,12 5 or that a citizen
could sue to enforce procedural requirements under the National
Environmental Policy Act when a federal facility was being constructed

See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975);
Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
121 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562.
122 Id. at 571-72.
123
1 Id. at 573.
124 Id. n.8.
125 Id. (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n. v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478
U.S. 221, 230-31 (1986)).
120

31

Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never Again)
next door to them.126 Scalia's basic point was that Congress could not
eliminate the injury-in-fact requirement with citizen suit provisions. 2 7
Scalia defended his view with several arguments, calling on both
constitutional principles and case law for support. Constitutionally he
relied on the doctrine of separation of powers, 28 as the Court did in its
early standing cases. However, Scalia's reasoning was slightly different
from that employed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Those cases expressed reluctance to adjudicate abstract claims because the
resolution of general policy issues was considered the domain of the
political branches; Scalia's concern was more specific. He first reiterated
the more general separation of powers concern that motivated the earlier
cases, saying that "[v]indicating the public interest (including the public
interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the
function of Congress and the Chief Executive." 29 However, he then went
on to state that "[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public
interest in executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual
right' vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty, to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' Art. II, § 3.,,130
Scalia's major concern, then, seems to be that the citizen suit provision
without an injury in fact requirement will allow the courts to overpower
the executive in the scheme of checks and balances by denying the
executive the appropriate discretion not to enforce the laws.
In terms of case law, Scalia drew particularly on the line of
jurisprudence used in Massachusetts v. Mellon, in which the Court

16 Id at 572.
127 Whether or not this meant that citizen suit provisions were in fact unconstitutional
as
written in the ESA and other statutes was unclear after Defenders of Wildlife was
decided. Scalia certainly seemed to suggest that "all persons" could not be understood as
allowing suits by individuals without injuries in fact without violating Article 1H. See id.
at 601. However, this could be taken to mean that he construed citizen suit provisions to
accommodate this understanding and that they were therefore constitutional within that
constraint.
1281d. at 559-60.
29 Id. at 576.
130 Id at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 3).
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As seen
characterized "generalized grievances" as nonjusticiable.' 3
above, the reasoning underlying that determination at the time was largely
prudential, rather than constitutional, concerned as it was with the large
numbers of claimants who would supposedly overwhelm the courts. 132
Scalia's use of this strand of case law to support his constitutional
argument is therefore unconvincing. He also drew on more recent cases,
however, to support his proposition. 133 These included Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War and Allen v. Wright.134

Both

reiterated the point that "the generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance .

.

. is an abstract injury," and therefore cannot
35

serve as a basis for standing.1
Both of these cases, however, as well as others that Scalia cited,
involved citizens challenging the constitutionality of government action,
not a lack of compliance with statutory regimes. Scalia acknowledged this
distinction in his opinion, but brushed it off as inconsequential:
To be sure, our generalized-grievance cases have typically
involved Government violation of procedures assertedly
ordained by the Constitution rather than the Congress. But
there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III
inquiry turn on the source of the asserted right. Whether the
courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement
described in our cases, they would be discarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role
of the Third Branch-one of the essential elements that
identifies those "Cases" and "Controversies" that are the

13

Id. at 574 (citing 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).

132See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.

1 See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 575-76.
134 See id. (citing Allen, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Schlesinger, 418 U.S. 208 (1974)).
1 Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217; accordAllen, 468 U.S. at 755-56. The Court made a
similar point in O'Shea v. Littleton, 418 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) ("Abstract injury is not
enough.").
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business of the courts rather than of the political
branches. 136
The assertion that the Article III inquiry should not turn on the source of
the right at issue is itself problematic from a separation of powers
perspective, and therefore undercuts the rationale that supposedly
underlies the injury in fact requirement in the first place. It suggests that
Congress should not have the power to utilize a private attorneys general
model when it deems that model to be necessary and proper. This
argument, as well as Scalia's constitutional justification for injury in fact
generally, will be addressed in more detail in Part II. "'
Scalia also drew a plurality of the Court to his argument that the
plaintiffs' injuries were insufficiently redressable. 38 He argued that the
agencies responsible for funding the overseas projects would not
necessarily be bound by any judgment the Secretary of the Interior might
make upon consultation, and therefore requiring the consultation to occur
might not remedy the injury.' 39 Further, even if the agencies were to be
bound by a judgment, the small percentage of funding the agencies
provided to the projects meant that any Court remedy would not
necessarily4 prevent the projects from moving forward and injuring the
plaintiffs.

Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence in Defenders of Wildlife
expressing his views on the intersection of standing and Congressional
creation of causes of action.141 He stated that "Congress has the power to
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a
case or controversy where none existed before, and I do not read the
Court's opinion to suggest a contrary view."1 4 2 Kennedy thought
Congress had not done this with the Endangered Species Act, because the
Act's citizen suit provision did not establish outright that violations of the

136
137

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576.
See infra notes 216-217 and accompanying text.
See Defenders of Wildife, 504 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 569.

140 Id. at 571.

See id. at 579-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
at 580.

141
142Id.
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law per force injured the "any person" that the provision entitled to bring
suit. 43 He then said that the Article III case and controversy requirement
constituted the "outer limit" of Congress' power to confer rights of action,
and that this requirement prevented Congress from establishing "citizen
suits to vindicate the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper
administration of the laws" because "the party bringing suit must show
that the action injures him in a concrete and personal way."
D. The War Over Standing
The Court's position on standing has varied in the time between
Defenders of Wildlife and its most recent decision in Summers, and the
cases reflect a sharp division between those justices who would expand
standing and those who would narrow it. Critically, the Court's decisions
since Defenders of Wildlife, whether ruling for or against environmental
plaintiffs, have all worked within the general rubric of injury in fact,
specifically the three-part test that Scalia laid out in his opinion for the
majority in that case. This has meant that even when the liberal bloc on
the Court has managed to build a coalition to liberalize standing
requirements, victory has come at the price of giving further precedential
weight to the injury in fact test. The consequences of this loyalty to the
Scalian approach can be seen in Summers, and will be explored in more
detail in Part III.
The Court's next major environmental standing decision after
Defenders of Wildife came in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Environmentl45 in 1998. In that case, plaintiff organization Citizens for a
Better Environment ("CBE") sued for a steel plant's past violations of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act ("EPCRA").1 46
The injury claimed was a purely informational one; it was uncontested that
the defendant had not met its reporting requirements under the statute, and
CBE argued that the deprivation of that information was itself an injury in

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (construing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1988)).
'"Id.
at 580-81.

143
145

146

523 U.S. 83 (1998).

Id. at 86; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1986).
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fact.147 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said that it was unclear
whether an informational injury would be adequate to meet the injury in
fact standard.148 He went on to state that the Court would not address the
question, however, because CBE failed to establish redressability and
therefore clearly failed the standing test on that ground.149 CBE requested
a number of different remedies from the Court, all of which Scalia found
would not redress CBE's injury because of its basis in past actions.' 50 In
the course of his analysis, he explained that:
although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the
fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a
wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation's laws
are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an
acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a
cognizable Article III injury.' 5 1
While overtly a point about redressability, this is a backhanded
commentary on the injury requirement itself. It reiterates what Scalia
implied in Defenders of Wildlife in his rejection of procedural injury - the
presumed injury that would be remedied by "psychic satisfaction" is
psychic dissatisfaction, and if psychic satisfaction is not a remedy for a
cognizable Article III injury, then "psychic [dis]satisfaction" cannot
constitute a valid injury in fact.152 While Steel Co. more generally stood
for the proposition that it would be very difficult to establish standing to

Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 83.
Id. at 84. This question would later be decided in plaintiff's favor in FEC v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998), over the dissent of Justices Scalia, Thomas and O'Connor.
149 Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105.
0
Id. at 102-10 (finding that each of five proposed remedies did not redress the injury; in
the case of injunctive relief, "[b]ecause respondent alleges only past infractions of
EPCRA, and not a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive
relief will not redress its injury").
147

148

.' Id. at 107.
152

See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572-78 (1992).
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sue for wholly past infractions,153 this point about psychic injury is
particularly interesting because of its relevance to the Court's next major
decision.
In 2000, the Court decided Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
EnvironmentalServices (TOC), Inc.154 This was a case brought under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, wherein plaintiffs
complained of repeated National Pollutant Discharge Emission System
permit violations by defendant Laidlaw. 5 5 Friends of the Earth offered
member affidavits from individuals who lived near the facility and were
concerned about the potential effects of Laidlaw's pollution on their river
activities, such as swimming, fishing, and camping.' 56 While they had no
proof that the river or surrounding environment had actually been
Justice
damaged, their concern led them to curtail these activities.
Ginsburg wrote for the majority that "[t]he relevant showing for purposes
of Article III standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury to the
plaintiff." 5 8 In the circumstances of this case, the consequences of this
statement were that the plaintiffs had a valid injury in fact by virtue of
their discontinuation of outdoor activities, even though that
discontinuation was based purely on their concern for the river's
cleanliness, rather than on any actual environmental damage (which was
minimal).15 9 While this holding did not go so far as to overrule Justice
Scalia's holding in Steel Co. about "psychic injury," since the injury itself
is still the inability to engage in activity, the idea that injury could be
based purely on concern rather than actual environmental damage was a
significant liberalization of standing law. The Court also found that the
plaintiffs had standing to seek civil penalties as a remedy, despite Steel

153Michael

J. Wray, Still Standing? Citizen Suits, JusticeScalia'sNew Theory of
Standing and the Decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 8 S.C.
ENVTL. L.J. 207, 217 (2000).
'4

528 U.S. 167 (2000).

ss Id. at 176-79.

'Id. at 181-83.
ss Id. at 181.
'"9 Id. at 184.
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Co., given the ongoing nature of the violations and the potential deterrent
value of penalties.' 60
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented from both
holdings, as well as a third about mootness.' 6 1 He objected to the Court's
finding of injury in fact without any actual injury to the environment, and
thought that the plaintiffs failed on redressability because they sought only
civil penalties, which would not necessarily deter further violations.
This last point raised serious constitutional concerns for Scalia regarding
the capacity for courts and private litigants to invade the constitutional
Justice Kennedy wrote a short
realm of the Executive branch. 6 3
concurrence also expressing some hesitation about those constitutional
concerns, but stating that this was not the correct case in which to address
them given that the questions presented did not present the issues
squarely. 1
The trend of liberalizing standing continued with the Court's next
major standing decision, Massachusetts v. EPA.1 65 This case was
somewhat unique among the Court's standing decisions because of its
intense political salience; it concerned the question of EPA's statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, and dealt
directly with the harms resultant from global warming.' 6 6 With regard to
standing, the question was whether the state of Massachusetts could
establish injury in fact, causation, and redressability based on the loss of
coastal land caused by global warming and concomitant rising sea
levels.' 6 7 A five-Justice majority found that Massachusetts had standing,
First, relying on a 1907 case called
based on two different theories."
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., Justice Stevens wrote for the majority
that states, because of their status as "quasi-sovereign" entities, deserved

160

id. at 186-87.
198-215.
162 Id. at 202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163Id. at 209-10.
'6 Id. at 197 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16' 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
166 See id. at 505.
11 Id. at 519.
'68 Id. at 519-23.
161Id. at
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"special solicitude" in the context of standing analysis.' 6 9 He then
proceeded to engage in the usual three part test for standing.' 70 The injury
in fact, argued the majority, was the loss of coastal land that
Massachusetts would suffer as a result of global warming. 7' Because sea
levels had already risen ten to twenty centimeters at the time of the
lawsuit, the harm qualified as imminent.1 72 Further, the Court said, the
fact that "these climate-change risks are 'widely shared' does not
minimize Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation."' 73 As
to causation, the Court stated that while EPA's failure to regulate
greenhouse gases was not the sole cause of global warming, it was
nevertheless a significant factor contributing to Massachusetts' injury and
therefore satisfied the causation requirement.174 The Court used similar
reasoning for redressability, arguing that while EPA's regulation of
greenhouse gases would not fully remedy global warming, it would "slow
or reduce" the process.175
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissent on standing, which was
joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alitol 76 (Justice Scalia wrote a
separate dissent on the merits for the same four Justices 77 ). Roberts
rejected Stevens' reading of Tennessee Copper, arguing that the case dealt
solely with remedies rather than standing, and therefore rejecting outright
the concept that states should have any special solicitude in standing
analysis.178 He then confronted the Court's findings on each of the three
elements of standing.' 79 He argued that the injuries associated with global
warming were by the nature of the phenomenon insufficiently

169 Id. at
0
7 Id. at
171Id. at

519-20 (construing 206 U.S. 230 (1907)).
518-21.
521-23.

id.
173 Id. at 522. The Court cited FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998), for this proposition;
172

the same idea surfaced in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972).
174 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-25.
7 Id. at 525.
176 Id. at 535-549 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
77
Id. at 549-560 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
17 Id. at 537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 537-46.
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particularized and imminent.' 8 0 Causation was also problematic, argued
the dissent, because the complexities and global nature of climate change
precluded EPA from being considered the cause of coastal land loss.' 8 1
Further, for these same reasons, EPA regulating greenhouse gases would
not remedy that injury, because global warming would continue (due to
the unpredictable acts of third parties) despite being potentially abated by

a court order.182
The majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA gave heart to
environmental plaintiffs by seeming to seriously relax the causation and
redressability requirements, or as Chief Justice Roberts stated in dissent,
allowing plaintiffs to "sue over any little bit."' 8 3 The opinion also treated
the injury in fact requirement somewhat more leniently than the Court had
in the past, especially in terms of imminence and particularization.
Between Laidlaw and Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court seemed to be
establishing a trend towards liberalizing standing. It is worth highlighting,
however, that despite the liberal justices' victories in these two cases, the
decisions maintained the basic framework of "injury in fact." As will be
argued in more detail later, this concession to the conservative view of
standing law is a fatal flaw in any effort to truly change that law for the
benefit of environmental plaintiffs and the environment itself. It also
allows the Court more latitude to revert to conservative standing
principles, which is in fact what happened in Summers (discussed in Part
III).
PART II: NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS
I have attempted to show in Part I that the origins of the injury in
fact test are obscure at best, and justified only marginally, if at all, by
reasoned constitutional argument. Later proponents of the test have
offered constitutional justifications for it, briefly sketched in Part I, which
I will address in more detail and rebut in this Part before turning to the
Court's most recent standing decision in Summers.
80

Id at 540-43.

"8 Id at 543-45.
.Id at 545-46.
183 Id at 546.
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It is important to establish at the outset of any constitutional
discussion that standing itself is not fundamentally contestable as a
constitutional concept. The basic separation of powers ideal that runs
throughout the Constitution precludes the Court from serving as a general
policy maker. Plaintiffs should clearly not be able to petition courts for
new environmental protection policy. Further, it is incontestable that, in
order for the case and controversy requirement to do any work, courts'
jurisdictions must be limited such that courts do not tread on the ground of
the political branches. However, when the legislature has established
policy in statutes, and especially when those statutes contain citizen suit
provisions, citizens should be able to vindicate their rights under those
statutes in court. The requirement that they demonstrate injury in fact, at
least as the Court understands it, is not constitutionally defensible.
Proponents of the injury in fact doctrine offer several major
constitutional justifications, two of which Scalia spelled out in Defenders
of Wildhfe. He argued first that allowing courts to adjudicate claims when
plaintiffs did not suffer an injury in fact amounted to allowing courts to
vindicate the public interest, which he said was the exclusive function of
the political branches.184 Scalia's particular concern, however, was with
the public interest in the government's observation of laws and
constitutional constraints.18 5 He objected to courts taking jurisdiction over
such complaints because, according to his view, courts co-opt the
executive function of enforcing the law in doing so.1 86
Simply because the plaintiff is not injured in any concrete, tangible
manner does not mean that vindicating her rights under a relevant statute
will cause the court to tread on the constitutional territory of another
branch of government. The requirement that the plaintiff have a concrete
interest at stake, rather than an abstract interest in environmental
preservation or in the government following the law, is not inherent in
Article III. Rather, it is a vestige of the private law model in which the
injury in fact model's origins lie.' 87 From a perspective unbiased by that
184

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992).

185 id

'8 6 See supranotes 129-130 and accompanying text.
187

See Percival,supra note 27, at 158 (rooting conservative standing doctrine in "the

traditional paradigm of private law litigation").
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historical trend, there is nothing innately unconstitutional about a court
rendering judgment based on abstract harm.
The easiest case for which to argue this point is that wherein
Congress has explicitly provided for citizen suits in a piece of legislation.
Almost every major environmental statute has a citizen suit provision that
allows citizens to bring suit against violators or the administering
agency.
For these laws, Congress has made the legislative judgment
that the agency alone has insufficient resources to ensure proper
enforcement of the law, and has enlisted the public to serve as private
attorneys general.189 Under these circumstances, there is little reason to
worry about separation of powers in the context of courts serving as
policy-making institutions - the policy underlying the suit has already
been properly and democratically instituted by the political branches; the
court is serving only to uphold and enforce the law as written.190
However, this point serves to highlight Justice Scalia's alternative
separation of powers grievance regarding lax standing requirements namely that without an injury in fact requirement, the courts serve not just
as policy-makers, but as enforcers of the law, and thereby tread
unconstitutionally on the traditional and constitutional function of the
executive branch.191
This objection, while facially compelling, is a shallow one. It
assumes that the Constitution's grant of powers to each branch of
government is exclusive.' 92 While it may have been realistic to interpret
1 88

See Cassandra Stubbs, Is the EnvironmentalCitizen Suit Dead? An Examination of the
Erosion ofStandards ofJusticiabilityfor EnvironmentalCitizen Suits, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 77, 77 n.3 (2001) (collecting statutes).
189 The concept behind this term can be traced to FCC v. Sanders Brothers.
See supra
note 47. The term itself originated with the case of AssociatedIndus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d
694 (2d Cir. 1943), and was most famously employed in Ass'n ofData ProcessingServ.
Orgs., Inc., v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
190 See generally Buzbee, supra note 14; David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing,
Environment and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2004) (arguing
that standing should be determined by reference to statutory language).
191See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992); Antonin Scalia, The
Doctrineof Standing as an EssentialElement of the Separationof Powers, 17 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 881, 882-83 (1983).
192 See Scalia, supra note 191, at 881 ("The principle of separation of powers was set
forth in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts well before it found its
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the Constitution this way at one point, the rise of the administrative state
Administrative agencies,
has rendered such a reading obsolete.
technically a part of the executive branch, exercise both legislative and
judicial powers, in addition to executive ones. While this fact has been the
subject of constitutional controversies, these have almost entirely been
resolved in favor of agency authority.19 3 This establishes that branches of
government exercising powers designated to other branches is not in and
of itself necessarily constitutionally problematic. Courts can therefore
serve as enforcers of the law without offending Article II, and indeed they

have. 194
Justice Scalia's more specific concern, however, seems to be with
executive discretion - namely that it is not within the courts' purview to
take on an enforcement function because it will interfere with the
executive branch's inherent discretion to only enforce certain laws in
certain cases.1 95 Scalia's first major writing on standing came in a 1983
article in the Suffolk Law Review, in which he elucidated an argument
about standing and separation of powers that is strongly reflected in his
later Supreme Court opinions. 196 In that article, he made reference to a
famous passage by Judge Skelly Wright wherein Wright envisioned a role
for courts in the enforcement process: "Our duty, in short, is to see that
way into the federal document ... : 'the legislative department shall never exercise the
executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the
legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the
legislative and executive powers, or either of them."' (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art.
30)).
193 The doctrine of non-delegation, while it enjoyed a brief hey-day in 1935, see A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), has since been definitively repudiated, see Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457
(2001). Administrative agencies, technically a part of the executive branch, therefore
constitutionally wield legislative power all the time. The same is true of judicial power.
See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). This
demonstrates that separation of powers is by no means absolute in the modem
administrative state.
194 See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 173-79 (offering several examples from early
American history, such as qui tam and informers' actions).
195 See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
196 See Scalia,supra note
191.
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important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are not
lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy."l 97
Scalia acknowledged this as an indication of the role courts had come to
play in "assur[ing] the regularity of executive action," but rejected that
role from a normative standpoint.198 He said in response:
Does what I have said
interests are affected,
heralded in the halls
misdirected in the
bureaucracy?'

mean that, so long as no minority
'important legislative purposes,
of Congress, [can be] lost or
vast hallways of the federal

Of course it does -- and a good thing, too.

Where no particular harm to particular individuals or
minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs
ought to get lost or misdirected, in vast hallways or
elsewhere. 199
Scalia's argument here is in part a substantive critique of the content of
environmental laws; he offers no procedural or institutional explanation
for why a lack of harm to minorities and individuals should mean that
laws should be "lost or misdirected," so one is left to assume that his
complaint about such laws is their content, the loss or misdirection of
which would be "a good thing, too." However, he offers minimal
constitutional explanation for why the executive branch should have such
broad discretion to ignore democratically enacted laws. 200
From a separation of powers perspective, it makes little sense that
the Executive branch should have that sort of discretion. It makes
7 Id. at 884 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).

198 id

Id. at 897 (alteration in original).
200 See Daniel A. Farber, A Place-BasedTheory ofStanding, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1505,

1533 (2008) ("A cynic might say that Justice Scalia had rewritten the clause to require
the president to 'take care that the law befitfully executed."'). Scalia generally writes off
the problem of lack of enforcement as one that can be addressed by the political process,
see infra note 202 and accompanying text; however, there is little justification for having
such intense concern about potential excessive enforcement and no concern about what
would seem to be the parallel problem of lack of enforcement.
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intuitive sense for the legislature to have complete discretion over whether
to enact laws; that same intuition does not hold for the executive branch
and enforcing those laws once enacted. The Executive's constitutional
role, and duty, is to enforce democratically enacted programs.201 Justice
Scalia believes that the electoral process will provide sufficient remedy for
202
However, this is not the usual
executive recalcitrance in this duty.
approach to constitutional impropriety - when the President or Congress
takes unconstitutional action, it is not generally assumed that the public
will take care of the problem through the electoral process; rather, the
Court usually strikes the action down.20 3 Scalia offers no explanation for
why inaction should be treated any differently than action for
constitutional review purposes, especially when that inaction (failure to
enforce) can have the very significant impact of rendering Congress

impotent. 2 04
Scalia's main justification for why courts should not be in the
business of enforcement generally, without a concrete injury at stake, is
that courts exist fundamentally for the purpose of protecting minorities
rather than majorities, and "there is no reason to believe they will be any
good at [the latter]."205 While it is true that courts' fundamental purpose
is antimajoritarian in some sense, insofar as the courts have the capacity
The fact that prosecutorial discretion is so well entrenched in the criminal context
should not carry over to the administrative context. This is primarily because courts are
only prevented from forcing the executive branch to enforce laws constituting or
administered by agencies when agency action is left to agency discretion by the organic
statute. See 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2) (2006); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985).
This is directly opposed to the criminal context, wherein prosecutorial discretion is
judicially protected and not dependent on statutory language.
202 Scalia, supra note 191, at 896 ("There is surely no reason to believe that an alleged
government default of such general impact would not receive fair consideration in the
normal political process."); accordJonathan H. Adler, God, Gaia, the Taxpayer, and the
Lorax: Standing,Justiciability,and SeparationofPowers After Massachusetts and Hein,
20 REGENT U. L. REv. 175, 195 (2008) ("Less-than-complete enforcement of
environmental statutes may be the result of majority preferences. If not, there is at least a
opportunity for political redress.").
potential
03 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
204 See Hodits, supranote 19, at 1932-33.
205 Scalia, supra note 191, at
896.
201
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and duty to protect individuals against majority infringements on their
rights, this fact does not actually make for a strong argument in favor of
Scalia's approach. The basic point of his argument is that courts do not
have the policy sophistication of the elected branches and cannot
effectively determine in the abstract when certain laws should be enforced
based on the interests of the majority (and therefore should act to enforce
them only when the rights of injured individuals are at stake). 206 But
policy sophistication is irrelevant in light of what courts actually do when
faced with suits by statutory beneficiaries alleging statutory violations.
From a practical standpoint, the actions of the court in the case of a suit
seeking enforcement of an environmental statute will be the same whether
the regulatory beneficiary has a concrete injury at stake or not. Regardless
of whether it is a hiker or a concerned citizen or the Sierra Club who
requests an injunction requiring the Forest Service to follow the
appropriate procedures under the applicable statute, the court's reasoning
on the merits will be the same. 207 It will determine what the law requires
and whether the agency's interpretation of that law was reasonable or
not.208
Given that a court's reasoning on the merits will be the same
regardless of whether the plaintiff has an injury at stake or not, it is
unreasonable to use this factor to allow some beneficiaries into court but
not others. Indeed, Scalia's antimajoritarian argument would make more
sense if he were committed to limiting standing only to regulated parties.
In that case the courts truly would be serving only as countermajoritarian
defenders of minority rights, rather than protecting minorities and some
members of the majority (when a concrete interest of theirs happens to be
at stake). However, beneficiary standing has been well entrenched in case

206id

Standing is, after all, only a threshold inquiry. Even under the current system, once
the plaintiff in a case like Summers has established the appropriate injury, her argument
on the merits need not have anything to do with that injury, and can invoke the public
interest generally. This happens in many if not most environmental cases; for a specific
and recent example, see Winter v. NaturalResources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365,
368 (2008), discussed in Part III. See infra notes 261-263 and accompanying text.
208 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
207
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law since Sanders Brothers in 1940. 209 More importantly, it has also been
codified in the APA.2 1 0
Even were this not the case, there is something perverse about
understanding the massive and powerful corporate entities regulated under
environmental statutes as "minorities" in need of protection by the
courts. 211 While these entities may be smaller in number than the majority
who voted in favor of environmental protection, their influence in the
regulatory and enforcement processes is disproportionately large, due to
the financial resources at their disposal and their powerful lobbying
capacity. In light of this fact, it does not seem rational to fear for the
interests of the numerical minority being subject to tyrannical oppression.
Congress presumably sought to enlist citizens into the enforcement
process, via citizen suit provisions, precisely because Congress feared
inadequate enforcement in the face of agency capture and other
disproportionate "minority" influence.2 12
This brings us back to the basic question of the citizen suit
provision and what role Congress should play in getting plaintiffs into
court. I have argued broadly that the injury in fact requirement is
unjustified from a separation of Fowers perspective and that the parade of
that would result without such a
separation-of-powers-horribleS21
requirement is overstated. My underlying point is that an environmental
statute on point with a citizen suit provision should be enough to get any
interested plaintiff into court, regardless of whether or not that plaintiff has

209
210
211
212
213

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
See generally Pleune, supra note 4, at 284-97.
Sunstein, supra note 18, at 219.
The other type of horrible often cited, as noted earlier, is prudential - namely that
without an injury in fact requirement, citizens would bring frivolous suits that would be
insufficiently adverse (as the majority in Flast v. Cohen feared) or too great in number (as
the majority in Frothinghamfeared). See supra notes 35, 26 and accompanying text.
These concerns, too, are overstated. While the environmental groups may be motivated
by ideology rather than concrete injuries, this does not have negative implications for
their capacity to properly argue their case. See Hessick, supra note 12, at 323 ("A litigant
investing in such a suit is driven by principle, and the desire to vindicate that principle is
likely to provide adequate motivation to litigate effectively."). Further, the groups' finite
resources will insure against frivolity in their litigation decisions.
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a concrete interest at stake. This includes statutes that confer only
procedural rights, such as the National Environmental Policy Act. As
noted above in Part I, in his opinion for the majority in Defenders of
Wildife, Justice Scalia rejected the idea that Congress can override the
basic standing requirements by legislation conferring procedural rights. 214
He does not believe that "procedural injury" should be a cognizable injury
because he does not believe that the general public interest in having the
government act in accordance with the law is sufficiently concrete and
particularized for standing purposes. 2 15
As noted above, however, all of the case law cited in Defenders of
Wildlife in support of Scalia's view on procedural injury involved citizens
challenging government action that was allegedly unconstitutional, not
allegedly in violation of a statutory provision.2 1 6 While he argued that
"there is absolutely no basis for making the Article III inquiry turn on the
source of the asserted right," 217 in truth the source of the right should be
significant. This is because, unlike statutes with citizen suit provisions,
the Constitution does not provide for citizen enforcement of its own
provisions. Instead, it relies for enforcement on the structural ideals of
checks and balances and separation of powers, and more practically (at
least after Marbury v. Madison), it relies on the Court to apply its
strictures as against the other branches of government. Environmental
statutes, by contrast, have citizen enforcement built in. The source of the
asserted right should make a difference in terms of citizens' ability to
pursue that right in court, since one source of rights allows for citizen
enforcement and the other does not. The string of cases denying citizen
standing to challenge the constitutionality of government action should,
therefore, not bear on the question of citizen standing to challenge the
legality of government action under a particular statute that allows for
citizen enforcement. While Justice Scalia argues that the citizen suit is
unconstitutional insofar as it allows plaintiffs into court without a concrete
injury (that is, based only on their interest in having the government act
See supranotes 122-127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 129-130 and accompanying text. Justice Kennedy expressed a similar
view in his concurrence. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
21 See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
217 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 576 (1992).
214
215
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according to the law), his arguments in favor of that constitutional
understanding, as discussed above, are ill-founded.
When a statute does not have a citizen suit provision, the reasoning
is less obvious but fundamentally no different. In such cases, the
legislature has not explicitly provided for citizen enforcement, so plaintiffs
hoping to prevent environmental damage on the basis of that statute must
bring suit under the APA. Section 702 requires plaintiffs seeking review
of agency action to be "adversely affected or aggrieved within the
meaning of the relevant statute"; 2 8 the question (from a normative
perspective) is thus identical to that of any standing inquiry - what harms
to what interests should qualify as sufficient? Justice Douglas in Data
Processinginterpreted § 702 to require injury in fact within the zone of
interests contemplated by the statute, but as already discussed, this is
normatively unjustified from a constitutional perspective.219 Plaintiffs
should have to show that they have interests at stake under the statute, but
the types of harms that qualify for standing can be broader,
constitutionally speaking, than those specific and concrete injuries that the
Court has thus far espoused.
PART III: SUMMERS AND A NECESSARY SHIFT

The Court's most recent standing decision in Summers v. Earth
IslandInstitute, decided in March 2009, can serve as a useful lens through
which to view competing arguments about constitutional standing
requirements, and ground each argument by viewing its factual
consequences.220 The case had a lower profile than Massachusetts v.
EPA, by virtue of dealing with the relatively mundane issue of timber
sales rather than the politically charged issue of global warming. This fact
may have played into the Court's conservative decision to limit standing
in Summers; this possibility itself shows the necessity of a more dramatic
shift in standing law than those undertaken in Laidlaw or Massachusetts v.
EPA. Those cases liberalized the standing test while maintaining the
underlying framework of injury in fact, allowing the Court further leeway
5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
220 See 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009).
218

219
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to use that test to once again narrow the availability of standing. This
outcome is unjustified by constitutional reasoning and goes against the
ideals of environmental protection.
A. The Case
In Summers, Earth Island Institute and several other
environmental groups sought to challenge a Forest Service regulation that
exempted salvage-timber sales on certain small parcels from notice and
comment procedures under the Forest Service Decision-Making and
Appeals Reform Act ("ARA").2 2 1 Suing under the general judicial review
provision of the APA, the plaintiffs alleged this regulation to be "arbitrary,
capricious, and not in accordance with law." 222 Specifically, the plaintiffs
challenged the regulation as applied to a salvage-timber sale in the
Sequoia National Forest called the Burnt Ridge Project.22 3 An affidavit
from a member of Earth Island Institute confirmed that he used the area
frequently, had firm intentions and plans to do so again, and would be
injured in his ability to view the local flora and fauna by the lack of
opportunity to comment on the proposed sale.224 Standing on this ground
was uncontested, but the Burnt Ridge dispute was settled; this left only the
facial challenge to the regulations at issue. 22 5 The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Scalia, reversed the two lower courts and held that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue that facial challenge.2 2 6 In so
holding, Scalia wrote:
We know of no precedent for the proposition that when a
plaintiff has sued to challenge the lawfulness of certain
action or threatened action but has settled that suit, he
retains standing to challenge the basis for that action (here,

Id. at 1147-48 (citing 16 U.S.C. §1612 (2006); 36 C.F.R. §§ 215.4(a), 215.12(f)
(2008)).
222 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (No. 07-463).
221

223

224
225

226

d

Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149.
d

Id. at 1150.
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the regulation in the abstract), apart from any concrete
application that threatens imminent harm to his interests.
Such a holding would fly in the face of Article III's injuryin-fact requirement. 227
The plaintiffs had tried to establish standing by various means,
several of which relied on an affidavit from another member, Jim
Bensman.2 2 8 That affidavit asserted that Bensman had a history of visiting
National Forests in the past, and had been injured in the past by his
inability to receive notice and comment on projects under the challenged
regulation.229 Justice Scalia and the majority rejected this argument,
230
stating that past injury was not sufficient to establish standing.
Earth Island also argued, however, that Bensman had a consistent
and continuing interest in visiting National Forests, and that "the denial of
ARA rights impairs those interests on a continuing basis. Bensman's
averments . .. demonstrate impairment of 'concrete' interests attributable

to the Forest Service's procedures." 23 1 The majority did not accept this
argument, holding that the respondents had failed to allege specific
injuries to specific tracts.2 32 The Court characterized this as "a failure to
allege that any particular timber sale or other project claimed to be
unlawfully subject to the regulations will impede a specific and concrete
plan of Bensman's to enjoy the National Forests." 233 The majority held
that this failure was critical in terms of being able to establish injury in
fact, because:
There may be a chance, but [it] is hardly a likelihood, that
Bensman's wanderings will bring him to a parcel about to
be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the
22 7

1Id.

at 1149-50.

22 8

1Id. at 1150.

229 id
230id

231 Brief for

Respondents at 42, Summers, 129 S. Ct. 1142 (2009) (No. 07-463) (citation

omitted).
232 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150.
233
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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regulations.... Accepting an intention to visit the National
Forests as adequate to confer standing to challenge any
Government action affecting any portion of those forests
would be tantamount to eliminating the requirement of
concrete, particularized injury in fact.
The particularization requirement seems to have made a comeback here
from its diminished status in Massachusetts v. EPA, where the generalized
harm of coastal loss due to global warming was found sufficient to
establish standing. Scalia underscored this point for the majority with the
statement that "generalized harm to the forest or the environment will not
alone support standing."2 3 5 While Bensman did allege a specific desire to
visit the Allegheny National Forest, Scalia reaffirmed the holding from
Defenders of Wildhfe that "'some day' intentions" will also not suffice to
establish injury in fact. 236
Lastly, the plaintiffs tried to establish standing via procedural
injury, arguing that their lack of access to notice and comment was itself
an injury. 237 They attempted primarily to distinguish their procedural
injury from that rejected in Defenders of Wildhfe: "There, the plaintiffs
sought not to enforce procedural rights afforded them, but internal
procedures requiring intra-governmental consultations; thus, they asserted
only 'an abstract, self-contained, noninstrumental "right" to have the
Executive observe the procedures required by law."' 238 In this case, by
234 Id. at 1150. Earth Island had taken this fact to argue the opposite point, namely that
naming tracts where plaintiffs would be injured in the future was "an obvious
impossibility" and therefore the requirement was presumably unreasonable. Brief for
Respondents, supra note 231, at 44-45.
235 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1149. The revival of the language of particularity is notable
given that Scalia had been forced to tone down this element of his argument in Defenders
of Wildlife. See supra note 27; see also Percival,supra note 27, at 130 ("In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, Justices Kennedy and Souter refused for months to join Justice
Scalia's initial draft opinion because it sought to convert the prudential notion that courts
should decline to hear generalized grievances into a constitutional one that would bar
environmental plaintiffs from seeking redress for widely shared injuries.").
236 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150-5
1.
237 Id. at 1151.
238 Brief for Respondents, supra note 231, at 47 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992)).
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contrast, Earth Island argued (quoting the Defenders of Wildlife
concurrence in a clear attempt to appeal to Justice Kennedy) that the
procedural rights created by the ARA "are aimed at protecting the
commenters' concrete interests in the use and enjoyment of the national
forests, and do not violate the principle that Congress may not 'confer
injury."'239
rights of action ... in the absence of any showing of concrete
Earth Island also drew on language from Massachusetts v. EPA to argue in
favor of a procedural injury, citing the proposition from that case that
"[w]hen a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has
standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will prompt
the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that allegedly harmed
the litigant."240 Both arguments in favor of a procedural injury were
reasonable given the language of the statute at issue and the favorable
treatment the Court gave procedural injury in Massachusettsv. EPA.
Just as he had in Defenders of Wildlife, however, Scalia rejected
the procedural injury approach in the Summers majority opinion, stating
that "deprivation of a procedural right without some concrete interest that
is affected by the deprivation - a procedural right in vacuo - is insufficient

to create Article III standing." 241 In this statement, he implicitly rejected
Earth Island's argument that its members' interests in the National Forests
could qualify as a concrete interest for purposes of a procedural injury, but
did not address that argument directly. He further specified that it made
"no difference that the procedural right has been accorded by Congress";
while such a procedural right could "loosen the strictures of the
redressability prong," it could not get plaintiffs around injury in fact, the
"hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by
statute."24 2 While Scalia's statement about redressability is somewhat of a
concession from his position in Defenders of Wildlife (which had garnered
239

Id. (quoting Defenders of Wildhife, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

Id. at 40 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007)).
241 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1151.
242 Id. Here Justice Scalia prominently cited Justice Kennedy's concurrence from
Defenders of Wildlife stating that "the public's nonconcrete interest in the proper
administration of the laws" would not create standing. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 580-81 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
240
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only a plurality), the basic rejection of procedural standing is a powerful
reminder of Congress' limited ability to get environmental plaintiffs into
court.
Justice Kennedy, in addition to joining the majority, wrote a
somewhat obscure concurrence on this point, reiterating his position from
Defenders of Wildlife that, while procedural injury alone would not suffice
to create standing, Congress has the ability to "provide redress for a
concrete injury" and thereby create cases and controversies "'where none
existed before."' 24 3 He thought that this case did not present that
circumstance, however, since he did not view the ARA as an attempt by
Congress to "identify or confer some interest separate and apart from a
procedural right."244 Presumably, this means that if Congress had granted
the public a specific right to the preservation of the National Forests from
salvage-timber sales, Justice Kennedy would find standing; however, this
raises the question of why Congress should be able to create a substantive
right that is enforceable in court, but not a procedural one. It is also
unclear why a procedural right should require a concrete interest at stake
and a substantive right should not.
The dissent, authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter, took issue with the majority's treatment of
organizational standing and the doctrinal consequences of City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons. 245 The basic point of the dissent, adopting an argument
from the plaintiffs' brief, was that environmental organizations should be
allowed to sue to enforce environmental laws when their membership has
been injured in the past and is likely to be injured in the future.24 6 Breyer
argued that the upshot of Lyons was that when a plaintiff has been injured
in the past, as in Lyons, she need only show a "realisticlikelihood that the
challenged future conduct will, in fact, recur and harm the plaintiff." 247
Given the group's large membership and the Forest Service's concession
that it would likely pursue hundreds of salvage-timber sales and other
actions without notice and comment procedures, Breyer considered it
243Id. at
2 44

1153 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Defenders of Wildife, 504 U.S. at 580).

id.
Id. at 1153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
246 See id. at 1155-56; Brief for Respondents, supra
note 231, at 43-44.
247 Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
245
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realistically likely that the organization's membership would suffer injury,
and would have granted standing on that ground.24 8 Scalia and the
majority rejected this reasoning as "a hitherto unheard-of test for
organizational standing... 249
B. Implications
The consequences of the outcome in Summers, where plaintiffs are
not allowed standing based on procedural and abstract injuries, are
unappealing from both constitutional and environmental perspectives.
The ARA requires that the Forest Service "establish procedures, including
public hearings where appropriate, to give the Federal, State, and local
governments and the public adequate notice and an opportunity to
comment upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines
applicable to Forest Service programs." 250 The Forest Service regulation
eliminating notice and comment procedures for sales of small tracts is
very arguably in violation of this statutory mandate. Society therefore has
an interest in the regulation being investigated in court and potentially
invalidated. The only way to accomplish this is for a plaintiff to challenge
the regulation in court in the first place. Jim Bensman and other members
of the plaintiff environmental groups, however, could not establish any
imminent injury in fact to support standing for a facial challenge under the
traditional test, since without a specific tract of land at issue, a
concrete/factual injury would be impossible. The regulation could
therefore remain in place indefinitely. Moreover, because the regulation
cuts off notice and comment for these tracts, it limits potential plaintiffs'
ability to even realize when an illegal action is pending thereupon. Thus,
the odds that any given plaintiffs "wanderings will bring him to a parcel
about to be affected by a project unlawfully subject to the regulations" 25 1
must be multiplied by the equally small odds that said plaintiff will even
be aware that the project is pending. The resultant probability of a
plaintiff achieving standing under the rule of this case is therefore very
24

8

24

9

250
251

1 d. at 1156.
1 d. at 1151.

16 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (2006).

Summers, 129 S. Ct. at 1150.

55

Injury in Fact, Then and Now (and Never Again)
small, which means that the regulation will go unchallenged for a longer
time, allowing hundreds of tracts to be unlawfully sold without public
participation.2 5 2
This result is not ideal - neither in terms of the rule of law nor in
terms of the fate of the lands and organisms involved. The root cause of
that result, namely the Court's failure to find standing in Summers, is
unnecessary and unjustified. Several factors of this case render the
constitutional arguments in favor of strict standing rules particularly inapt
in context. Those arguments rely on separation of powers concerns and a
narrow conception of the judicial role as a protector of minority rights.
Recall that, in Justice Scalia's formulation, the separation of powers
concerns were twofold. One concern was that without an injury in fact
requirement, the courts would become policy makers.2 53 The second was
that without injury in fact, courts would be acting as general discretionary
enforcers of laws, which treads on the constitutional ground of the
executive branch.2 54 As regards the first, the concern is unfounded in this
case because the Appeals Reform Act clearly requires notice and comment
proceedings to accompany Forest Service actions.
In agreeing to
adjudicate Earth Island's claim that the Forest Service's regulation is
counter to that statutory mandate, the Court would not be making policy
but merely enforcing it. As regards the concern that courts enforcing laws
without a concrete injury at stake would intrude upon the executive's
enforcement discretion, the argument just makes no sense in this context.
This case does not present the situation where the executive branch is
choosing not to enforce the law against a particular individual; instead, the
executive branch is itself violating the law (via the Forest Service's
curtailment of notice and comment), and there is no constitutional reason
why the executive should have the discretion to do so. While electoral
252Id. at

1153-54 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Ann E. Carlson, Standingfor the
Environment, 45 UCLA L. REv. 931, 957 (1998) ("[I]n any facial challenge to a newly
enacted rule, regulation, or statute, plaintiffs may have difficulty in demonstrating
'imminent' injury unless they can show a specific and harmful application of that rule,
regulation, or statute. Thus environmental plaintiffs may have to wait to challenge new
policies of general application until they have been implemented, with the possibility that
real damage will already have occurred." (footnote call number omitted)).
253 See supra note 184 and accompanying
text.
254
See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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accountability could resolve the problem, instead of the courts, that would
yield potentially as many as four years of irreparable damages to the
environment. 255 There is no reason to believe that the Framers would
have endorsed such a counterintuitive result. Instead, separation of
powers concerns seem to weigh in favor of allowing suit in this case, since
continuing application of an executive branch regulation in violation of a
congressional statute is counter to separation of powers principles. The
courts should be able to exercise their judicial power to rectify such an
imbalance.
With regard to judicial role, Justice Scalia's arguments about
courts existing to protect only the rights of injured minorities are similarly
inapposite in this case. The plaintiffs are regulatory beneficiaries, and are
therefore members of the majority regardless of whether they have an
injury in fact or not. The defendant here is an executive agency; the
Forest Service, as a component of the government responsible for
democratically enacting the law, is also part of the majority. As such, the
entire framework of the counter-majoritarian argument does not apply to
this case and others like it, because there is no minority party whose rights
are being infringed. While one could argue that this is all the more reason
for courts not to get involved, this argument would ignore the fact that this
kind of suit, by regulatory beneficiaries against the government to compel
enforcement, is commonplace, sensible, and, most importantly, enshrined
in the APA.25 6
For another way to think about these broad arguments in context,
consider the results of granting standing to Earth Island in this case.
Specifically, consider the consequences of finding standing without any
sort of injury in fact - that is, not based on the dissent's conception of
probabilistic injury in fact, but rather based purely on the group's interest

See supra note 202 and accompanying text. It is also unrealistic to imagine that most
voters would take into account the Forest Service's track record at following the ARA in
voting for President. This factor renders the electoral accountability argument somewhat
disingenuous; while proponents might argue that if voters don't care about the
enforcement of a law then it should be ignored (as Scalia in fact argued in his law review
article, see supranote 199 and accompanying text), this argument is counter to the
constitutional design and insufficiently values the rule of law as such.
255

256

See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
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in environmental protection and their procedural injury claim under the
ARA. As argued in the abstract in the previous Part, the Court's reasoning
on the merits would be absolutely no different under these circumstances
than it would be if Jim Bensman were able to name a particular tract
subject to a particular project alleged to be unlawful. The Court would ask
whether Congress had spoken to the issue of notice and comment and, if
not, whether the Forest Service's interpretation of the statutory provision
was reasonable. 257 The presence or absence of an injury in fact has no
impact on this inquiry whatsoever.
It makes little sense for the threshold injury of standing to be so
divorced from the merits of the case.25 8 It forces environmental protection
groups to go through the charade of establishing injury to some relatively
inconsequential interest, like that of a small number of members in hiking
or bird watching, in order to become eligible to fight for the interests of
the resources themselves. This result is conceptually indefensible, and
persists only by virtue of the tradition requiring plaintiffs to show a
concrete injury. Granting standing to Earth Island and other groups based
on their interest in environmental protection (and absent an injury in fact)
would thus have the advantage of being intellectually honest about what
enforcement lawsuits are actually about. The actual interests motivating
lawsuits such as this one are not those of hikers to enjoy pristine
wilderness, or of bird-watchers to catch a glimpse of a rare species.
Instead, the Earth Island Institute, whose stated mission is "conserving,
preserving, and restoring the ecosystems on which our civilization
depends," 259 presumably has the more high-minded goal of saving the
actual resources at stake by forcing government and private actors to act in
accordance with environmental law.
The point is clearer to see in cases where standing is granted and
the parties are able to argue the merits. Take another case from the 2008See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
258 This phenomenon is a symptom of the fact that public
standing law is a vestige of
private and common law actions, where the plaintiff's injury would by definition be the
subject of the suit. See generally Percival,supra note 27.
259 Earth Island Institute, About Us, http://www.earthisland.org/index.php/aboutUs/ (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009).
257
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09 term as an example. In Winter v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
an environmental group sued the Navy for failure to adequately meet its
obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act 26 0 with regard to
its use of active sonar in military exercises, which was alleged to be
harmful to whales and other sea life off the coast of southern California. 26 1
To establish standing, the group filed affidavits from several of its
members stating that they were avid whale watchers and that injury or
death to the whales in that region would injure their ability to see
This was sufficient injury for standing purposes, but
whales. 262
demonstrates the extent to which the standing inquiry distorts the actual
values at stake in litigation such as this. Common sense suggests that it is
unlikely that a major environmental organization would go to court just to
protect the interests of a few people in seeing marine mammals;
presumably, then, the interests of the whale watchers were not the primary
focus of the litigation. Rather, the actual interest at stake from the
plaintiffs' perspective was the health of the whales. 2 63 The standing
inquiry in this case and others like it merely distorts the nature of the
underlying claim. 264
It could be objected that liberalizing standing doctrine by
eliminating the injury in fact requirement would flood the courts with
groups like Earth Island Institute, who are motivated purely by

260

261
262
263

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).

129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).

See Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Winter, 555 U.S. 365 (No. 07-1239).
For another example of a similar distortion, see Animal Legal Defense Fund,Inc. v.

Glickman, 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998), wherein plaintiff had to assert an "aesthetic"
injury to his interest in seeing captive animals treated humanely, instead of being able to
simply assert his emotional and ethical interest in seeing the animals treated humanely as
lawfully required under the Animal Welfare Act.
264 Christopher Stone, a law professor at the University of Southern California and author
of an important 1972 paper on environmental standing, made the point succinctly in a
recent interview: "Oh, for Pete's sake, just sue in the name of the seals" ...... "The seals
are being bludgeoned to death and somebody's saying, 'I want to be seeing seals.' That's
not what it's about. It's a very backwards way of getting the case into court." Rebecca
Tuhus-Dubrow, Sued by the Forest:Should Nature be Able to Take You to Court?,
BosTON GLOBE, July 19, 2009, at C4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ideology. 265 This concern is not particularly realistic, however, given that
environmental groups, as well as individual plaintiffs, have limited
resources. This will prompt them to litigate strategically, as they already
do. Without an injury in fact requirement, however, organizations would
target their efforts toward suits that would curb the most problematic
violations of environmental law rather than toward suits where they could
establish injury in fact. Further, even if there were an increase in suits by
ideologically motivated litigants, this would not be a normatively
undesirable result. It is critical to remember that all such suits, like
Summers, allege violations of existing laws, and therefore ideological
motivation is irrelevant - suits will be limited by the provisions of
democratically enacted laws like the ARA. Society has an inherent
interest in proper enforcement of its laws, 266 and thus allowing more
plaintiffs to challenge statutory violations is by no means an inherently
undesirable outcome.26 7
CONCLUSION

While Summers does not drastically change the law of standing, it
is notable that it did not cite Massachusetts v. EPA once, nor did it cite any
See Farber,supra note 200 at 1542 (noting that the injury in fact test will tend to "limit
litigation by plaintiffs who are ideologically motivated because it requires them to do
more work prior to filing suit"). Further, an ideological motivation might not be the
worst thing, even by conservative lights. One conservative commentator has criticized
the concept of the citizen suit by arguing that it provides economic incentives for
environmental groups to litigate, via attorneys' fees, and that it is ultimately these
economic incentives that motivate citizen suit litigation rather than environmental
concerns. See Michael S. Greve, The PrivateEnforcement ofEnvironmentalLaw, 65
Tul. L. Rev. 339 (1990). A narrow standing requirement forcing litigants to have a
personal and concrete stake seems to theoretically support that sort of financially
motivated litigation on the part of environmental groups. Broadening the standing
requirement to allow ideological litigants would, by contrast, seem to better address
Greve's concern.
26 6
See Steven L. Winter, What ifJustice Scalia Took History and the Rule ofLaw
Seriously?, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y. F. 155, 161-63 (2001).
267
But see Jonathan H. Adler, Stand orDeliver: Citizen Suits, Standing,and
EnvironmentalProtection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 61-63 (2001) (arguing that
optimal enforcement is less than full enforcement).
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part of Laidlawthat was not itself citing to Defenders of Wildlife. 26 8 This
demonstrates that any incremental gains that advocates of liberal standing
doctrine achieve at the Supreme Court level are not necessarily secure, at
least to the extent that each gain retains the basic structure of the injury in
fact test. Especially in cases involving timber sales, wildlife, and other
mundane environmental issues without drastic human consequences at
stake, the Justices are unlikely to perform the jurisprudential contortions
that they used to find standing in Massachusetts v. EPA. 269 To address the
problems with standing law that I have attempted to elucidate in this
paper, a more drastic shift in standing law is necessary. Such a shift,
namely eliminating the injury in fact requirement, would serve both to
protect natural resources and preserve the rule of law. Common sense, not
to mention legal and environmental ethics, demand that citizens have
some redress when government or private entities violate environmental
laws. This holds even in cases where there is little at stake except the
fundamental rights of trees or water to exist unmolested, and the abstract
public interest in having government follow and enforce its own laws.
The injury in fact requirement, no matter how attenuated, is incompatible
with this end. To properly do justice, the Court must abandon the doctrine
as a failed experiment that is ill suited to the public and environmental law
contexts. By doing so, the Court could better reconcile the requirements
of standing with the realities and necessities of modern environmental law.

The opinion cited to Laidlaw twice, both times for the basic standing test elucidated in
Defenders
of Wildife.
269
Laidlaw is admittedly a notable exception. However, the result there can be explained
by the make-up of the court, which was more amenable to liberal standing at the time, as
well as the repeated and egregious violations of the law that were at issue in that
particular case.
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